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ARTICLE 9: WHAT IT DOES NOT DO FOR
THE FUTURE
Grant Gilmore*
On a purely formal level any system of law is complete. An-
swers will be provided for any questions that can be asked. On
a more meaningful level, no system of law, codified or uncodi-
fied, is much more than what Justice Holmes, referring to the
maritime law, once called "a limited body of customs and ordi-
nances."' The law deals with the real problems that real people
have today - not with the problems our fathers had yesterday,
not with the problems our children may have tomorrow. Law
reflects what exists; it does not create, shape, or change. It is
a mirror; what is not before the glass is not there. Thus it is
nonsense to talk about a law of outer space, world peace through
law, and things like that.
These reflections are familiar to any draftsman of statutes.
On the strength of what you have learned from the past you
must write down today something that will help solve tomor-
row's problem. There is always a choice between loose or open-
ended drafting and a style that is tight, detailed and precise.
The tighter you make your statute - and the detail with which
you enrich it can come only from what you see around you now
- the more certain it is that in a very few years the statute
will be out of date, outrun by changing circumstance, no longer
relevant. The more open-ended, the less help it will be in solving
real problems, deciding real cases.
If, as a draftsman of a commercial statute, you are dealing
with a practice or transaction which is familiar, which has been
going on for some time, which appears to be stable, then the
job is fairly easy. I talked yesterday about the patterns and
techniques of inventory and receivables financing which came
into use between 1900 and 1950. In drafting article 9, there
was no great problem in dealing with those transactions: all that
had to be done was to simplify the legal framework so that busi-
nessmen and bankers could go on doing what they were already
doing to everyone's satisfaction.
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. Dissenting in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 220 (1916).
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There comes a point at which the draftsmen of any statute
must abandon problem-solving and rest content with a basic
term which is left undefined.
Article 9, for example, provides that anything that is prop-
erty can be made the subject-matter of a security interest. The
article does not tell you what property is. Even for a lawyer,
the "what is property?" problem presents no difficulty when
you are dealing with goods, chattels, things: if you can see it,
count, weigh and measure it, it exists; if you can't, it doesn't.
But intangible claims are another matter entirely. Perhaps,
"what is property?" is the wrong way of putting the question.
We might put it this way: what types of claims or choses in
action, although in some sense they do not yet exist, can be pres-
ently transferred, for security or otherwise, with the result that
today's assignee will have priority over interests that attach
to the fund after it has indisputably come into existence? Every-
one seems to agree that money to be earned in the future under
an existing contract can be so transferred: the assignee's claim
to the money when it is earned will, it is said, "relate back" to
the date of the assignment. 2 Beyond that point there is an im-
mense confusion of case law. Respectable courts have held that
there can be a presently effective transfer of, for example: the
proceeds (if any) of pending litigation,3 the expectancies of
heirs,4 the future royalties or profits of books not yet written,5
songs not yet composed, 6 motion pictures not yet produced.7 On
the other hand, the New York Court of Appeals held in 1946
that a membership or seat on the New York Stock Exchange
could not be effectively assigned until the Board of Governors
of the Exchange sold the seat, thus converting it into money.8
The decision saddened a large New York bank which had taken
an assignment of the seat as security for a loan to a member of
the Exchange who died insolvent owing both state and federal
2. See Rockmore v. Lehman, 128 F.2d 564, rev'd on rehearing, 129 F.2d 892
(2d Cir. 1942).
3. See Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882) ; Fairbanks v. Sargeant,
117 N.Y. 320, 22 N.E. 1039 (1889).
4. See, among the many cases that could be cited, In re Barnett, 124 F.2d
1005 (2d Cir. 1942). Lena v. Yannell, 78 N.J. Super. 257, 188 A.2d 310 (1963),
collects a good many cases of this type.
5. Ward, Lock & Co. v. Long, [1906] 2 Ch. 550.
6. Harms, etc. v. Stern, 229 Fed. 42 (2d Cir. 1915).
7. Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 144 N.E.2d
387 (1957).
8. In re Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1946). The principle of the
Gruner case was affirmed, and perhaps extended, in In re City of New York v.
Bedford Bar & Grill, 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d 575 (1959).
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taxes. And the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dealt recently
with the interesting case of the widow of the bandleader Glenn
Miller, who assigned to Universal Films the right to make a pic-
ture about her late husband, featuring the "Glenn Miller Sound."9
The picture was made, was highly successful, and Universal paid
Mrs. Miller several hundred thousand dollars under the assign-
ment - all, alas, within one taxable year. Said the Second Cir-
cuit: it is entirely clear that what Mrs. Miller sold Universal
was not property; therefore, she must pay income tax at 90%,
not capital gains tax at 25 %. And we may inquire whether the
future inventory and the future receivables of a business enter-
prise -which must necessarily come into existence so long as
the enterprise goes on being an enterprise - are to be regarded
as a presently existing aggregate or as individual bits and pieces
of after-acquired property.
From a drafting point of view, it would have been easy
enough to provide that a seat on the Stock Exchange, Mrs. Mil-
ler's interest in her late husband's life and sound, to say nothing
of the future inventory and the future receivables, either are or
are not property - or at all events that they can (or cannot) be
presently transferred with priority over subsequently arising
interests. The article 9 draftsmen chose not to do so.
Another of the basic terms is "security interest." For this
term we do have a definition, or something that looks like a
definition - indeed half of a page of it (§ 1-201(37)). The
drafting style is that of a general statement followed by a num-
ber of specific instances or examples. The general statement is:
"'Security interest' means an interest in personal property
.. which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
The rest of the half-page is taken up with explanations of when
such things as consignments and leases do or do not create secu-
rity interests. There had been a good deal of pre-Code litiga-
tion of this sort about consignments and leases, so the draftsmen
were on familiar ground.
But, when we move away from familiar ground, how are
we to tell whether we have a security interest or not? The gen-
eral statement, which I read to you, is not really a definition at
all: it is an act of faith. There have been a couple of recent de-
9. Miller v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 928 (1962).
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velopments on the security interest front which you may find
instructive.
Let us assume that A and B are both creditors of a common
debtor, X. A, for whatever reason you want to imagine, subordi-
nates his claim against X to B- that is, to take the simplest
kind of subordination agreement, X is to make no payments to
A until B's claim has been fully satisfied. This is a common ar-
rangement with which we have been familiar for a long time,
although there is surprisingly little discussion of it in the cases.
What case law there is deals with what happens when X, the
common debtor, goes into bankruptcy. The cases uniformly hold
that dividends in the bankruptcy liquidation will be paid out
according to the subordination agreement -that is, B receives
not only his own dividend but A's too. So far there is no security
interest problem: it is a matter of indifference to X or to his
creditors whether the money is paid out to A or to B. But there
is another side to the triangle- the A-B side. Let us assume
that A, after having subordinated his claim to B, assigns the
same claim to C. Or that A, instead of or as well as X, goes into
bankruptcy. Does B, the beneficiary of the subordination, now
have priority over C, the assignee, or over A's trustee in bank-
ruptcy? Should X, the debtor, make no payments on the debt
he owes A until B's claim has been satisfied or should he pay,
or can he be compelled to pay, the assignee or the trustee in
bankruptcy? On this leg of the subordination triangle there is,
curiously, no case law at all; the issues have never been liti-
gated.'0
It is entirely possible to say, in the terms of the article 9
security interest definition, that the subordination agreement
creates a security interest in the subordinated A-X claim in
favor of B (the senior debt) to secure payment or performance
of B's own claim against X. That would mean, among other
things, that B would have to perfect his interest, by filing or by
10. Since the foregoing discussion was written, there has been a case which,
at least arguably, does deal with the issue: In re Wyse (Pioneer- Cafeteria
Feeds, Ltd. v. Mack), 340 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1965). For discussion of sub-
ordination agreements, the lVyse case and article 9, see 2 GILMORE, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL P'ROPERTY c. 37 (1965) ; Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, The
Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in
Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79
HARv. L. REv. 229 (1965). The pre-lVYse case-law on subordination agreements
is collected in Calligar, Subordination Agreements, 70 YALE L.J. 376 (1961),
which appears to have been the first discussion of the problem in the legal
literature.
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a pledge, under article 9 if he wanted to be protected against
A's trustee in bankruptcy or C, our hypothetical assignee. It is
equally possible to say that the subordination agreement does
not create an article 9 security interest and that B's rights
against A's trustee in bankruptcy are not article 9 rights but
lie, since there is no case law, somewhere in the limbo of un-
created law.
Whether subordination agreements create security interests
is presently the subject of a briskly boiling controversy among
bank counsel and members of the corporate bar. If you happen
to be on the right mailing lists, hardly a day goes by without
still another letter coming in to say that: all subordination
agreements create security interests; no subordination agree-
ments create security interests; some do and other do not; arti-
cle 9 should be amended to say that subordination agreements
create security interests; article 9 should be amended to say that
subordination agreements do not create security interests; arti-
cle 9 should not be amended at all.
Let us turn from subordination agreements to negative cove-
nants, under which a debtor covenants that he will not transfer,
assign, mortgage or otherwise encumber his property (or a
specified part of it) until his creditor has been paid. Like the
subordination agreements, the negative covenants have been in
common use for a long time, there is surprisingly little case law,
and nobody really knows much about them."
Thirty or forty years ago, there was a type of covenant which
frequently appeared in corporate debentures. "Debenture" it-
self is a term of ambiguous reference: it has never been clear
whether "debenture" means a secured or an unsecured obligation.
The covenants, at all events, used to appear in two shapes or
sizes. There was an affirmative form which provided that if
the issuer should pledge or mortgage any of his assets, he would
see that the debenture-holders were ratably secured with the
pledgee or mortgagee. The negative form said that the issuer
would not pledge or mortgage his assets but that, if he did, the
11. For current discussion of negative covenants and article 9, see 2 GILMORE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL iIuoPERry c. 38 (1965), Coogan, Kripke &
Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordiation Agreements, Security Inter-
ests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation Agree-
ments, 79 HARv. L. REV. 229 (1965). The corporate debenture litigation referred
to in the following paragraph is admirably reviewed and analyzed in Jacob, The
Effect of Provisions for Ratable Protection of Debenture Holders in case of Sub-
sequent Mortgage, 52 HAv. L. REV. 77 (1938).
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debenture-holders were to be ratably secured. During the 1920's
and 1930's, these covenants, both affirmative and negative, were
extensively litigated. Much to the surprise of the corporate bar,
the courts regularly held that the covenants, however they were
phrased, meant exactly what they said. So these debentures
turned out to be secured obligations after all. Such covenants,
however, have not been heard of, at least in the case reports,
for thirty years. We may dismiss them as ancient history.
An absolute negative covenant is one in which a borrower
flatly promises that he will not transfer or encumber property
until the loan is paid. Until quite recently I would have said to
you: this one isn't worth a second thought. In the whole history
of American jurisprudence, there have been only three cases
which involved such covenants - one in West Virginia in the
1880's,12 one in Oregon in the 1920's, 13 and one in Delaware in
the 1950's. 14 All three of the cases held that the absolute cove-
nant not to transfer created no property interest which the
covenantee could enforce against an insolvency representative
(the West Virginia case) or against a purchaser with notice
(the Oregon case) or against an attaching creditor (the Dela-
ware case). But now the California court has spoken, Justice
Traynor has written an opinion - and these days when Justice
Traynor speaks, no dog barks.
The California case - Coast Bank v. Minderhout5) - is not
directly relevant to our discussion since it involved not personal
but real property. It appears that the California banks which
make land or home improvement loans have been taking from
the borrowers, instead of mortgages, covenants not to transfer
the land. The loan agreement which contains the covenant is
placed on file, presumably with the real estate records - at least
that was done in the Minderhout case- so no question of se-
crecy is involved. The Coast Bank made such a loan to the En-
rights who, without paying the bank loan and in violation of
the covenant, sold the land to Minderhout, who conceded that
he had actual as well as constructive notice of the covenant.
Held, that the negative covenant gave the bank an "equitable
12. Knott v. Manufacturing Co., 30 W. Va. 790, 5 S.E. 266 (1888).
13. Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Ore. 442, 215 Pac. 501 (1923)
rehearing denied, opinion modified, 108 Ore. 445, 216 Pac. 1020 (1923).
14. Fisher v. Safe Harbor Realty Co., 30 Del. Ch. 297, 150 A.2d 617 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
15. 38 Cal. Reptr. 505, 392 P.2d 265 (1964).
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mortgage" in the land and that a decree should issue foreclosing
the mortgage on the land in Minderhout's hands.
Let us assume that banks in California or elsewhere start
using negative covenants covering personal property- as in-
deed they do. Fresh from our study of the Minderhout case, are
we to conclude that such a covenant does create an "interest in
• . .property ... which secures payment or performance of an
obligation"? I can assure you that the article 9 draftsmen gave
no thought whatever to the question whether their security inter-
est definition did or did not catch negative covenants within its
net. The state of law at the time the definition was drafted was
that, except for the debenture cases which were perhaps sui
generis, no case had ever held that a negative covenant created
any sort of property interest against anyone. On the other hand,
Justice Traynor is a man to be reckoned with. So where does
that leave us?
I have given you two examples of trouble at the fringes of
the known world. The draftsmen could of course have put in
language to explain when or whether subordination agreements
and negative covenants created security interests, as they did for
the consignments and leases. There was no reason whatever
why they should have done so. If we now amend the article to
take care of the subordinations and covenants, next year or next
decade there will be new types of fringe agreements, no more
predictable than the two I have been discussing, which may or
may not create property interests which secure obligations. The
security interest definition can grow from half a page to a full
page and then to two pages - but you will still be left with noth-
ing more than an act of faith to keep you warm.
An unanticipated shift in practice, or even in the focus of
litigation without a corresponding change of practice, can have
odd results.
Recent field warehousing litigation presents an interesting
example of a shift in the focus of litigation, for no apparent rea-
son. From 1900 until approximately 1950, the only issue which
was ever litigated was whether the warehouse had been prop-
erly run; if it was, the warehouse receipts were warehouse re-
ceipts and the pledgee was a pledgee; if it was not, the ware-
house receipts were wastepaper and the pledgee was the recipi-
[Vol. XXVI
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ent of a fraudulent conveyance.' 6 The issue was essentially one
of perfection of the security interest by possession of the goods
through the warehouse receipts. The problem of perfecting a
security interest in goods held in a field warehouse sparked a
considerable controversy during the drafting of article 9. A
proposal that filing should be required was bitterly resisted by
the field warehouse people, who eventually carried the day. The
filing requirement was dropped and a curious sentence was
added to section 9-205, which contains the repealer of Benedict v.
Ratner which we discussed yesterday. The curious sentence says
that "this section does not relax the requirements of possession
where perfection of a security interest depends on possession of
the collateral by the secured party or a bailee." Perhaps that
means that the rule of Benedict v. Ratner is not repealed with
respect to field warehousing arrangements.
After 1950, the issue whether the warehouse was properly
run suddenly disappeared from litigation 7 but, in its place, a
host of new issues, which had never before been heard of, sud-
denly came to the surface. Assume that, despite the utmost dili-
gence on the part of the field warehouse company, there are no
goods in the warehouse on doomsday. This happens not infre-
quently. To whom is the warehouseman liable?18 From whom
may he recover? 19 If his employee, the custodian of the ware-
house, was involved in the fraud, is the custodian's negligence,
weakness, or criminality to be imputed to the Lawrence Ware-
house Company ?20 If the warehouse company discovers that the
16. Two excellent recent discussions of field warehousing are Skilton, Field
Warehousing as a Financing Device, 1.961 Wis. L. REv. 221, 403; Comment,
Financing Inventory Through Field Warehousing, 69 YALE L.J. 663 (1960). See
also 7 Gi.LmER, SECURITY INrERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY c. 6 (1965).
17. Or almost disappeared. For the few cases which attacked the "validity
of the bailment," all unsuccessfully, between 1950 and 1960, see the Comment,
69 YALE L.J. 663, 675, 687. In re United Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F.2d 316 (7th
Cir. 1960), invalidated a field warehouse, apparently because of careless release
procedures; the case is elaborately discussed by Skilton, Field Warehousing as a
Financing Device, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 221, 403, 420-38. For a case which shows
that anything can happen, see Matter of Pine Grove Canning Co., 226 F. Supp.
872 (W.D. La. 1963).
18. See First Nat'l Bank of Fleming v. Petzoldt, 262 F.2d 540 (10th Cir.
1958) ; Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Twohig, 224 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1955). Both
cases held the field warehouseman liable to the "true owners" of goods wrongfully
deposited in the warehouse.
19. The problem whether the field warehouseman can recover from guarantors
or sureties of the borrower is discussed, from contrasting points of view, in Owens
v. Banks Warehouses, Inc., 202 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1953) and in Lawrence Ware-
house Co. v. Menary, 143 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Iowa 1956).
20. On this question, see the Twohig case, cited n.18 supra; the Owens and
Menary cases, cited n.9 supra; American Express Field Warehousing Corp. v.
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bank and the borrower are being careless about withdrawals and
release practices, should it close the warehouse? If it does not,
could it be held liable to the borrower's other creditors or his
trustee in bankruptcy for having conspired to lend a false credit
to the foundering enterprise ?21 A new picture of the field ware-
houseman is beginning to emerge from the recent cases: he is
both more and less than a warehouseman; he is a sort of guar-
antor or surety. Of all these developments, article 9 says noth-
ing. It is odd that none of these issues had drawn judicial atten-
tion before 1950 - but they had not. If the draftsmen had been
clairvoyant, they might have seen that an area in which nothing
much had happened for fifty years was about to become a lively
center of litigation - perhaps for the next fifty. They were
not clairvoyant.
The most difficult situation that a draftsman faces is what
to do about what appears to be a major new development in the
area which his statute covers. Yesterday we talked about two
of the great mutations in security law during the past hundred
years. What would you have done if you had been commissioned
to draft a statute about inventory mortgages in 1870? Or a stat-
ute about non-notification accounts receivable financing in 1920?
It is, I think, arguable that we are witnessing today a third mu-
tation of comparable magnitude. The receivables which came
into use as security after 1920 were the short-term receivables
which arise when goods are sold or services are rendered. Ex-
cept in the construction industry, security assignments of mon-
eys to be earned in the future under relatively long-term con-
tracts had never been much used until World War II. During
the war, there was a great deal of financing of this type, but
in an obviously abnormal situation. Since 1950 its growth has
been as sensational as the growth of short-term receivables fi-
nancing after World War 1.22
The late Karl Llewellyn, who was the Chief Reporter for the
Code, was an unusually imaginative and intuitive man. He
seems to have sensed, as early as the 1940's, that something new
First Nat'l Bank, 233 Ark. 666, 346 S.W.2d 518 (1961); Nasif v. Lawrence
Warehouse Co., 122 F. Supp. 562 (S.D. Miss. 1954).
21. See Heekin Can Co. v. Kimbrough, 196 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1961),
which is perhaps the most interesting of the recent field warehousing cases.
22. For discussion of the problems reviewed in the following pages, see 2
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY c. 41 (1965), which ap-
peared in an earlier revision as The Assignee of Contract Rights and his Pre-
carious Security, 74 YALE L.J. 217 (1964).
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and important was happening. I mentioned yesterday that the
original drafting scheme for article 9 included a separate part on
long-term contract rights financing, which never in fact reached
draft stage. It is unlikely that much good would have resulted
from a full-dress treatment of the problem. A vaguely perceived
shift in practice, which may or may not prove to be permanent,
whose dimensions, if it is here to stay, can hardly be guessed at,
is not the stuff from which good statutes can be fashioned.
A draftsman who unluckily finds himself at grips with such
a monster should walk warily. His language should glint and
shimmer with ambiguity. He should be heard faintly and from
far away - like defunctive music under sea. I shall read to you
the operative portion of the principal contribution which arti-
cle 9 makes to the problems of security assignments of long-
term contract rights and you can judge how well the draftsmen
measured up to that prescription. Section 9-318(2) provides
that when such rights are assigned
"any modification of or substitution for the contract made
in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards is effective against an assignee unless the account
debtor has otherwise agreed but the assignee acquires corre-
sponding rights under the modified or substituted contract."
That seems to say that, to some extent, without the assignee's
consent, the two contracting parties can modify their contract
or even substitute a new contract. The modification or the sub-
stitution is "effective" against the assignee, who, however, ac-
quires "corresponding rights" under the new arrangement. To
what extent can assignor and obligor "effectively do this? To
the extent that they act "in good faith" and "in accordance with
reasonable commercial standards."
When New York adopted the Code, the solons of that great
state amended the provision I have just read to you. Under
the New York amendment, modifications or substitutions are
effective against the assignee only if they do not "materially"
and "adversely" affect his rights. The Editorial Board for the
Code has disapproved the New York amendment on the ground
that that is what the official text of section 9-318 (2) means in
any case, so that the amendment is unnecessary. 28
23. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Re-
port No. 2, p. 225 (1964).
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I do not know what the New York amendment means. It has
occurred to me to wonder whether a modification of a contract
which decreases the amount of money which will become payable
if the contract is performed but at the same time increases the
probability that the contract will be performed is one which ma-
terially and adversely affects the assignee's rights. But I do not
think that the Editorial Board was having one of its best days
when it remarked that the official Code text and the New York
text meant the same thing. I have, as a matter of fact, collected
what case law there is on this obscure subject and it is surprising
how many modifications of assigned contracts, which are quite
evidently to the assignee's serious disadvantage, have been held
effective against him. 24 The Code assignee under section
9-318(2) may indeed be better off than his common law
predecessor since he receives "corresponding rights" under the
new arrangement. What are "corresponding rights"? The pur-
suit of that fish would take us into waters a good deal too deep
for comfort.
The illustrations which I have so far given you of what we
may call the Code's open-endedness have all involved only the
Code itself or the relationship between the Code and the non-
Code or pre-Code law of the enacting state. But I have come
more and more to feel that the professor's joy and the practi-
tioner's grief over the next generation or so, in the field of se-
curity law and elsewhere, will be found at the intersection of
state law with a body of overriding, inconsistent federal law.
The new general federal commercial law rose from its own
ashes almost on the day that Erie Railroad v. Tompkinvs 5 was
decided. 26 In a series of cases, that was at first little noticed,
the Supreme Court began work on what has sometimes been
called a doctrine of federal supremacy. There was really two
sets of cases, running on parallel lines which will surely meet at
infinity. One set of cases dealt with the nature of federal stat-
utes. Like all other statutes, federal statutes are fragmentary,
incomplete and gap-ridden. From the beginning of the Republic,
the inarticulate assumption had been that gaps in a federal stat-
ute were to be filled in by reference to what Justice Holmes
24. See note 22 supra.
25. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
26. See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383 (1964). For documentation of the statements which follow,
the reader is referred to Judge Friendly's excellent article.
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called the "brooding omnipresence" of the common law- that
is, by reference to state law. That was both a reasonable and
a necessary assumption during the long period while the federal
statutory product remained meagre and ill-nourished. During
the 1940's, however, the Supreme Court began to suggest that
gaps in a federal statute should be filled in by extrapolation
from the statute itself: the underlying policy of the statute
would itself provide a rule for decision in situations which lay
within the statutory coverage but for which the statute made no
express provision. The other set of cases involved transactions
in which the United States itself, in one of its manifold capaci-
ties, was a party - as a buyer of goods, as a furnisher of equip-
ment, as a drawer or indorser of a check, as a lender of money.
The presence of the United States, the Court suggested, gave the
transaction a sort of federal aura which made it appropriate that
disputes should be resolved by a federal law of sales, negotiable
instruments, security transactions or what not. Of course, there
was no such law: you can summon spirits from the vasty deep,
but will they answer? But this aspect of the developing federal
supremacy doctrine made it possible for the federal courts to
pick and choose from the richly heaped smorgasboard of major-
ity rules, minority rules and better rules.
There are half a dozen federal statutes which deal with secu-
rity transactions in such things as patents, copyrights, ships,
aircraft and their spare parts, and railroad rolling stock. None
of these statutes is in any sense complete or comprehensive.
The Ship Mortgage Act of 1920 is the most detailed: it deals
not only with the formal requisites of ship mortgages and their
recording but with their foreclosure and with the relative pri-
orities of preferred ship mortgages and other maritime liens.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1948 not only establishes a national
filing system for security interests in aircraft but has a few
substantive provisions as well. The other statutes merely estab-
lish national filing systems, which are exclusive and mandatory
under the patent and copyright acts; the filing system for secu-
rity interests in railroad rolling stock is merely permissive - a
non-mandatory alternative for perfection under state law. There
is also a curious recent addition to the list - the Federal Motor
Vehicle Lien Act of 1958 - which provides for nationwide per-
fection of security interests in certain types of trucks and buses
used interstate on perfection under the law of a federally desig-
nated state.
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Thus there is a federal component to security transactions in
a great many kinds of transportation equipment.27 So far pat-
ents and copyrights have been used almost not at all as security
for loans, but it is a reasonable guess that bankers will not go
on forever ignoring this interesting type of collateral.2 8 Under
the theory that federal statutes are capable of generating their
own penumbra of supporting law, we may expect to see the con-
tention made, and perhaps accepted, that federal law applies to
all aspects of security transactions which involve aircraft, pat-
ents, copyrights and so on.
The United States does an immense money-lending business
- either as the direct source of credit or as a guarantor. There
seems to be quite a good chance that we will shortly discover
that all mortgages or other security interests held or guaran-
teed by the United States or one of its agencies are governed
by federal law - although of course no one knows what the fed-
eral law is or might be. There has been a series of cases in the
past half-dozen years which involved federal mortgages on live-
stock. The mortgagors having sold the livestock through cattle
auctions without authority, the United States, as mortgagee,
brought conversion actions against the auctioneers. Whether an
auctioneer who innocently sells stolen property is liable to the
true owner as a converter has been a much debated question
for a hundred years or more; no consensus has emerged from
the cases. The only novelty of the recent cases is that several
of the circuit courts of appeal have concluded that the presence
of the United States as mortgagee requires that a federal rule
be fashioned to determine the auctioneer's liability or non-
liability.29
Like all governments that have ever existed, the United
States collects with an iron hand all the debts that may be
owing to it. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the United States
27. On the several federal statutes which affect security transactions in trans-
portation equipment, see Comment, Mobile Equipment Financing: Federal Perfec-
tion of Carrier Liens, 67 YALE L.J. 1024 (1958) ; 1 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY C. 13 (1965).
28. See Kaplan, Literary and Artistic Property (Including Copyright) as Se-
curity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 254 (1954) ; Note, Copyright as Collateral in a
Secured Transaction, 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 90 (1964).
29. See United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957); United
States v. Union Livestock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962) ; United States
v. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 909 (1964).
The Eighth Circuit seems to have denied the "federal mortgage -federal law"
proposition in United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956).
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has a lien for unpaid taxes ;30 for its non-tax claim it has what
is called a priority under an old statute which is always referred
to as Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes.,' Until 1958 it was
generally assumed that any type of consensual security interest
- pledge, mortgage or what not - had priority over a subse-
quently accruing federal tax lien or priority claim. In 1958, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided a case called United
States v. Ball Construction Co.3 2 in a peculiarly baffling per
curiam decision. Nobody knew what the Ball per curiam meant,
but one thing it could have meant was that all consensual se-
curity interests were subordinate to subsequently accruing fed-
eral tax liens and priority claims. In 1961, however, the court,
in another per curiam decision, reversed the Seventh Circuit,
which had so read the Ball case. It followed from the second
case - United States v. Crest Finance Co. 33 - that there were
some kinds of security interests which did have priority over the
subsequent federal claims, but there was no way of telling which
kinds of security interests had the priority and which did not.
In 1963 the Court finally condescended to write an opinion, but
what Justice White had to say in United States v. Pioneer-
American Ins. Co.3 4 did nothing to gladden the hearts of counsel
for financing institutions.
It now appears to be firmly established - and this is an
overriding rule of federal law - that any security interest,
whether or not it is perfected under applicable state law, will
be subordinated to the subsequent federal claim to the extent
that-it covers property acquired after the federal claim attached
or represents advances made after that point. To prevail over
the federal claim, the prior security interest must be, in the
curious term which the Court has made fashionable, "choate"
- and to be choate both the amount of the loan and the property
subject to the security interest must be fixed and certain before
the United States gets its lien or priority.
I seem to be one of the very few people in the world -in
addition, naturally, to the nine Justices - who thinks that the
30. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-23.
31. 31 U.S.C. § 191. On the tax lien and the § 3466 priority, see Kennedy,
The Relative Priority of the Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate
and general Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954) ; 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY c. 40 (1965).
32. 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
33. 368 U.S. 347 (1961).
34. 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
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Court has done quite well in this situation. Since 1958 the writ-
ers of law review articles and the speakers at bar association
meetings have vehemently expressed their grief and anguish at
the Court's outrageous behavior - but so far neither the Jus-
tices nor the Congress seem to have been moved by this all but
universal condemnation.8"
At the close of yesterday's lecture, I commented that a
lender who took advantage of the article 9 floating lien provi-
sion would find himself outflanked and outwitted by the en-
croaching forces of the new federal law. The sequence of fed-
eral priority cases I have just discussed makes it entirely clear
that, no matter what the state law may say, the only safe type
of security arrangement is the old-fashioned mortgage, in a
specified amount, on real estate painfully described by metes
and bounds. The only sound advice to give any lawyer who is
tempted to experiment with floating liens and the like is: Don't.
Most important of all is the impact of the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act on security transactions which are in any sense im-
perfect, novel or offbeat. It would take at least another whole
lecture to say anything comprehensible about the intersection of
security law, and particularly article 9, with the Bankruptcy
Act. I shall therefore offer you only one thought about the Bank-
ruptcy Act - but it is a large, king-sized thought. When the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was drafted, a fundamental policy deci-
sion was that state, and not federal, law should determine the
validity against the trustee in bankruptcy of property interests
in the bankrupt's assets. Despite that decision there was always
a federal law component to the resolution of property issues in
a bankruptcy proceeding. In the beginning, the federal law com-
ponent was weak and the state law component was strong. Dur-
ing the seven decades of life with the Bankruptcy Act, the fed-
eral law component has continually strengthened at the expense,
naturally, of the state law component - partly through congres-
sional amendment of the act, partly through the developing case
law. And during the last two decades, the galloping growth of
the doctrine of federal supremacy has done nothing to check this
trend. Furthermore, in the administration of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings there is a built-in bias against the recognition of se-
curity interests. To any trustee in bankruptcy and to most ref-
35. The American Bar Association proposed a draft statute in 1959, but to
date there has been no congressional response. See Plumb, Whatever Happened to
the A.B.A. Federal Tao Lien Legislation?, 18 Bus. LAW, 1103 (1963).
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erees in bankruptcy - and at the level of the referee bankruptcy
law, for all practical purposes, stops - the only good security
interest is a dead security interest. Thus, no matter how tightly
drafted your state security statute may be, no matter how biased
in favor of financing institutions you may conceive it to be, you
can depend on the Bankruptcy Act to keep the debate open-
ended.
I have sketched for you today some of the many reasons why,
despite the enactment of article 9 of the Code, there will still be
work to keep our judges busy. It has sometimes seemed to me
that twentieth century judges no longer make law with the gay
and creative abandon of their nineteenth century predecessors.
Our judges have, perhaps, become too respectful of the legisla-
ture, too deferential to the statutory command. Perhaps some of
the matters we have discussed today will stimulate a throwback
to the great days of judging. If that should happen, I think it
would be a wonderful thing.
Most probably, however, we shall see the solution to these
problems and to other problems as they arise pursued by amend-
ments to the Code - perhaps by a federal enactment of the Code,
thus, at long last and by a reverse twist, realizing Justice Story's
dream. I think that the way in which the problem of amending
the Code is handled will prove to be of crucial importance. I
think that the amendment problem has been very badly handled
until now :36 let us hope that things will improve.
I shall close with a few words from a tribute which I wrote
on the occasion of Karl Llewellyn's death three years ago. Karl
Llewellyn was for fifteen years the Chief Reporter for the Code;
he was also, as you know, one of the great figures in the juris-
prudential thought of this century:
"Make no mistake: this Code was Llewellyn's Code; there
is hardly a line, which does not bear his stamp and impress;
from beginning to end he inspired, directed and controlled
it ....
"It was, I believe, Karl's non-systematic, particularizing
cast of mind and his case-law orientation which gave to the
statutes he drafted, and particularly to the Code, their pro-
36. I have set out my reasons for believing that the amendment problem
has been badly handled i na review of COOGAN, HORAN & VOGTS, SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMFRQIAL CODE, 73 YALE L.J. 1303 (1964).
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found originality. He was a remarkable draftsman and took
a never-failing interest in even the minutiae of the trade.
His instinct appeared to be to draft in a loose, open-ended
style; his preferred solutions turned on questions of fact (rea-
sonableness, good faith, usage of trade) rather than on rules
of law. He had clearly in mind the idea of a case-law Code:
one that would furnish guide-lines for a fresh start, would
accommodate itself to changing circumstances, would not so
much contain the law as free it for a new growth. ...
"We live in a world of yea-saying, a world in which who-
ever is not with us must be against us, a world in which
whatever is not white must be black, a world in which, it
may be, the true light shines. Karl Llewellyn was not a man
for such a world. He was a man more given to questions
than to answers, more taken with seeking than with finding.
He loved beauty in all its many forms; he delighted in the
infinite variety of things and people and ideas. He was not
perfect; he was merely, in his many-faceted humanity, a
strong and humble man, a man of great kindness and charity,
a man of understanding, a man of wit -a man who came
closer than most of us do, or will, to wisdom." 87
37. In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814-15 (1962).
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